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Abstract—Deep neural network has shown remarkable performance in solving computer vision and some graph evolved tasks, such as
node classification and link prediction. However, the vulnerability of deep model has also been revealed by carefully designed adversarial
examples generated by various adversarial attack methods. With the wider application of deep model in complex network analysis, in this
paper we define and formulate the link prediction adversarial attack problem and put forward a novel iterative gradient attack (IGA) based
on the gradient information in trained graph auto-encoder (GAE). To our best knowledge, it is the first time link prediction adversarial
attack problem is defined and attack method is brought up. Not surprisingly, GAE was easily fooled by adversarial network with only a
few links perturbed on the clean network. By conducting comprehensive experiments on different real-world data sets, we can conclude
that most deep model based and other state-of-art link prediction algorithms cannot escape the adversarial attack just like GAE. We can
benefit the attack as an efficient privacy protection tool from link prediction unknown violation, on the other hand, link prediction attack
can be a robustness evaluation metric for current link prediction algorithm in attack defensibility.
Index Terms—link prediction, adversarial attack, graph auto-encode, gradient attack
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MAny real-world systems can be represented as a net-work, such as social networks [1], [2], biological net-
works [3], communication networks [4], traffic networks [5]
and so on. In particular, some systems especially the social
networks are dynamic, and the links in such network always
change over time [6], [7]. How to test out the undiscovered
link or the link which will change in the future are usually
known as the link prediction problem. Link prediction is ca-
pable to benefit a wide range of real-world applications. For
instance, if we have already known some terrorist communi-
cations, we may find out some hidden links so as to discover
the potential terrorists by link prediction [8]. Link prediction
can also serve to recommendation systems [9]–[12], network
reconstruction [13], and node classification [14], etc.
In the past few decades, lots work of link predictions
have been proposed. The similarity-based algorithm is one
of the most popular link prediction methods, which as-
sumes that the more similar two nodes are, the more
likely they are to be linked. Node similarity can be di-
rectly captured by the essential attributes of nodes, such
as the personal information in social network [15], paper
detail in citation network [16] and semantic information
of web page network [17]. However, since the content and
attribute information are generally not available due to lim-
itations, most cases focus on the structural similarity only.
Neighbor-based similarity method is a simple but efficient
similarity-based method. The Common Neighbors (CN)
and Resource Allocation (RA) [18], classic neighbor-based
similarity methods, successfully applied to personalized
recommendation [19], [20]. Path-based index and random-
walk-based index [21] are two other kinds of similarity
index, taking advantage of network’s global topological
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information, usually perform better, such as the Katz in-
dex [22] and Local Random Walk (LRW) [21]. Recently, with
the tremendous development of deep learning models, the
embedding models have achieved remarkable performance
in many network tasks. Inspired by the advancements of
language model word2vec [23], some unsupervised network
embedding methods such as DeepWalk [24], LINE [25] and
node2vec [26] have achieved great success. The embed-
ding learned by these models can be directly applied to
a variety of network tasks including link prediction [24],
graph classification [27], [28], node classification [29], [30],
and community detection [31], [32]. The graph auto-encoder
model for link prediction, proposed by Kipf et al. [33], is
a variation of GCN which can learn node representation
efficiently by layer-wise propagation rule. Due to their
non-linear and hierarchical nature, deep learning methods
were shown great power and large potential in link predic-
tion [26], [34]. However, on the other hand, the vulnerability
of deep model was also revealed. In the field of computer
vision, deep models are easily fooled by carefully crafted
adversarial examples which has slight perturbation on the
clean image to make the deep model to achieve an incorrect
result. [35], [36]. The perturbations are usually hard to pick
out by human but let the deep model wrongly predict
with high confidence [35], [37]. The attack triggered by
adversarial examples are named adversarial attack. Here
we are interested in the questions: can link prediction deep
model be attacked by adversarial examples? The non-deep
predictors can be attacked as well? We propose and for-
mulate the link prediction adversarial attack problem, put
forward a gradient based attack method and discuss the
transfer attack on other predictors. The study of this paper
can benefit protecting the user privacy for certain cases, and
on the other hand, the attack is an efficient tool of robustness
evaluation for these state-of-art link prediction methods.
There are interesting works focusing on network safety
problem. By adding links to the nodes of high centrality,
Nagaraja [38] proposed the community deception method
against community detection algorithms. Waniek et al. [39]
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2proposed Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE)
algorithms, which can conceal community by adding and
removing some specific links. Besides, in the field of node
classification, NETTACK was proposed by Zugner et al. [40]
to make node classification algorithm invalid. NETTACK
generates adversarial network iterative according to the
changing of confidence value after adding perturbations.
They further proposed a principled strategy [41] for ad-
versarial attacks on unsupervised node embeddings, and
demonstrated that the attacks generated by node embed-
ding have significant negative effect on node classification
and link prediction. Dai et al. [42] proposed a reinforcement
learning based attack method, which learns the general-
izable attack strategy and only requiring prediction labels
from the target classifier. In aspect of network embedding,
Chen et al. [43] proposed the adversarial attack on a variety
of network embedding models via gradient of deep model ,
named FGA. FGA is capable of conducting network embed-
ding adversarial attack by merely modifying a few links to
change the embedding of target node significantly.
For link prediction, Zheleva et al. [44] proposed the link
re-identification attack to predict sensitive links from the
released data. Link perturbation is a common technique
in early research that data publisher can randomly modify
links on the original network to protect the sensitive links
from being identified. Fard et al. [45] introduced a subgraph-
wise perturbation in directed networks to randomize the
destination of a link within subgraphs to protect sensitive
links. They further proposed a neighborhood randomization
mechanism to probabilistically randomize the destination
of a link within a local neighborhood [46]. Distinguishing
from the perspective of privacy protection, these methods
for privacy protection can also be used evilly. For instance,
the terrorists in a communication network may use the same
technique to hide their activities. Many recommender sys-
tem based on link prediction methods may also be fooled,
which can make fraudsters or their products to be the one be
recommended to innocent users. Therefore, in the necessity
of privacy protection and measuring the robustness of link
prediction algorithms, the study of link prediction attack on
some certain links is urgently need. Until now, to our best
knowledge, it is the first time link prediction adversarial
attack is proposed.
In this paper, we propose a novel iterative gradient
attack (IGA), which is capable of conducting adversarial at-
tack on link prediction. Specifically, we make the following
contributions.
• We define and formulate the link prediction adversarial
attack problem, and propose a novel iterative gradient
attack (IGA) against GAE model. With slight link per-
turbation on the original clean network, the adversarial
network can lead the GAE to totally incorrect link
prediction results.
• Since real-world networks are complicated and usually
encounter limitations when conduct attacks, we pro-
pose two adversarial attack strategies, unlimited attack
and single node attack. The unlimited attack assumes
the attacker has high authority while single node attack
is more concealed but challenging.
• IGA has great attack transiferablitiy against deep or
other link prediction methods, including state-of-art
TABLE 1: The definitions of symbols.
Symbol Definition
G=(V,E) original network with nodes V and links E
Gˆ=(V, Eˆ) adversarial network with nodes V and updated links Eˆ
Eo, Eu and Et the observed link set, the unknown link set and the target link
Eβ , Eβ+/Eβ− the total perturbation link set, the added/removed link set of G
A and Aˆ the adjacency matrix of G and adversarial network Gˆ
Wi, s and σ the weight of ith layer, the sigmoid and Relu activation function in GAE
L and L˜ the loss function of GAE and the target loss function for Et
Yt the ground truth label of target link Et
η learning rate of training GAE
A˜ the score matrix calculated by GAE for link prediction
g and gˆ the gradient matrix and the symmetric gradient matrix
n the number of link modified in an iteration
K the iteration number for gradient calculation
kt the link degree of target link Et
Aˆh the hth adversarial adjacency matrix
gˆh the hth link gradient network
deep models and other classic similarity-based algo-
rithms. Comprehensive experiments are carried out to
testify its performance on different real-world data sets.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2,
we introduce our IGA method in details and explain its
attack ability against GAE. Attack transferability of IGA
is analyzed as well. In Sec. 3, we empirically evaluate on
multiple tasks, and compare the attack effects by utilizing
IGA and other baseline attack methods on several real-
world networks. In Sec. 4, we conclude the paper and
highlight future research directions.
2 METHOD
In this section, we will define and formulate link predic-
tion attack problem, and then introduce how adversarial
network is generated via IGA to conduct attack against
deep model based link prediction method, such as GAE,
and other classic link prediction methods.
2.1 Problem Definition
DEFINITION 1 (Link Prediction). For a given network repre-
sented as G=(V,E), V denotes the set of all nodes and E
denotes the set of all links. E is divided into two groups
Eo, observable by so far information, and Eu, unknown
by now need to be predicted, where Eo ∩ Eu=φ and
Eo ∪ Eu=E. Link prediction is conducted to predict Eu
based on the information of V and Eo.
DEFINITION 2 (Adversarial Network). Given the original
clean network G=(V,E), adversarial network Gˆ=(V, Eˆ)
is constructed by adding negligible perturbations Eβ on
G, to make link prediction methods f fail to predict
targeted link Et ∈ Eu, formulate as
Eˆ = E + Eβ+ − Eβ−, (1)
where Eβ+ ∪ Eβ− = Eβ , Eβ+ ∩ Eβ− = φ, Eβ− ⊂ Eo,
Eβ+ ⊂ (Ω− E) and Ω = {(i, j), {i, j} ∈ V, i 6= j}.
DEFINITION 3 (Link Prediction Adversarial Attack). For
the given network G and target link Et, generate an
adversarial network Gˆ to replace G as the network input
to make Link prediction method f fail to make accurate
prediction of link Et. The attack can be formulate as
max
Gˆ
I(f(G,Et) 6= f(Gˆ, Et))
s.t. |Eβ | 6 m,
(2)
3where I(·) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function, m is the
maximum number of modified links, Eβ = Eβ+ ∪ Eβ−.
2.2 Framework
Link prediction adversarial attack is triggered by carefully
crafted adversarial network, which is generated via GAE.
In this work, the adversarial networks are designed to fool
the link prediction methods. Given observable links of the
network as the input, link prediction methods can predict
the rest unknown links with satisfying performance. Then,
we generate adversarial networks for hiding the target link
to make them mis-predicted. In other words, when the
adversarial networks are input, most links can be correctly
predicted, while the target link will be mis-predicted. Sur-
prisingly, the adversarial network is almost the same as the
original one, and only a few links modified out of thousand
links in total compared with the original clean network. We
conduct attack through three stages: adversarial network
generator, adversarial attack and transferable attack.
In practice, we will probably encounter difficulties when
directly implement adversarial attack. Thus, we further de-
sign a more feasible attack strategy called single node attack,
which can better hide the actions of the attacker. Unlimited
attack is also valuable in many scenes where the attacker
have high authority. The detail of these two strategies will
be discussed below.
• Adversarial network generator. Aiming at the target
link and the original network specified, the adversarial
network generator is capable of providing the optimal
perturbation, effective but unnoticeable. For the target
link, we make it as the target of loss function in GAE,
and get the gradient network by calculating its partial
derivative to the input of GAE. Guided by the gradient
information, we get the adversarial network step by
step.
• Link prediction adversarial attack. Adversarial attack
is implemented by adversarial network to lead link
prediction method fail to precisely predict the target
link. Since adversarial network is generated based on
GAE, wrong prediction result of GAE is considered as
a successful attack. In real-world, perturbations added
on the clean network may encounter limitations, so we
put forward two practical attacks: unlimited attack and
single node attack.
• Transferable Attack. Lots of excellent link prediction
methods are applied to complex networks, and GAE
is one of them. The adversarial network generated via
GAE is effective against GAE itself, while is it possible
that the adversarial attack triggered by the adversarial
network can also make other link prediction methods
fail as well? We analyze the possibility of transferable
adversarial attack and conduct comprehensive experi-
ments to testify the transferability. More interestingly,
the attack performance shows that GAE is the most
robust method against the adversarial attack compared
with DeepWalk [24], node2vec [26], Common Neighbor,
Resource Allocation [18], Katz index [22] and Local
Random Walk [21].
2.3 Gradient-based Adversarial Network Generator
In this section, we explain how to generate the adversar-
ial network based on the gradient information from GAE
model.
GAE model for link prediction. Motivated by the con-
volutional neural network in the computer vision, graph
convolutional network (GCN) is proposed to directly im-
plement convolutions on graph [47]. It has been proved
that this propagation rule is the approximation of localized
spectral filters on graph. It is worth noting that we use the
two-layer GCN to approximate the graph convolution, so
that the GAE model can utilize the information of the nodes
that are at most 2 hop from the central node. The embedding
vector matrix Z ∈ RN×F of each node extracted by GCN
layers is calculated as
Z(A) = Aˆσ(AˆINW(0))W(1), (3)
where A is the adjacency matrix of the network as the input,
Aˆ = D˜−
1
2 (A+ IN )D˜
− 12 is the normalized adjacency matrix,
with IN is the identity matrix also inputted as one-hot
feature of node and D˜ii =
∑
j(A+IN )ij is a diagonal matrix
of node degree. W(0) ∈ RN×H and W(1) ∈ RH×F represent
the weight matrix of the first layer and the second layer of
GCN, respectively. N represents the number of nodes, H
and F represent the feature dimension of the first and the
second layer of GCN. σ is the Relu activation function.
After calculating the embedding vector matrixZ for each
node, then we calculate the probability of all links:
A˜ = s(ZZT ), (4)
where s is the sigmoid function and A˜ ∈ RN×N is the score
matrix. For the link whose score is larger than threshold, we
think the link should exist as predicted. In our case, we set
the threshold to 0.5.
To train the model, we construct the loss function for
supervised training as the cross-entropy error as
L =
∑
ij
−wAij ln(A˜ij)− (1−Aij) ln(1− A˜ij), (5)
where w = (N2 − ∑ij Aij)/∑ij Aij is the weight for
weighted cross-entropy. Since in a real-world network, the
nonexistent links usually is much more than existing links,
in other words, the negative sample is much more than
positive one, we choose the weighted cross-entropy here as
our loss function to prevent the overfitting on the negative
samples.
Like many other machine learning tasks, GAE use gra-
dient descent to optimize the parameters in the model
W t+1i = W
t
i − η
∂L
∂W ti
, (6)
where η is the learning rate, i ∈ {0, 1} is the layer of weight.
W 0i is initialized as described in [48].
After properly tuning the hyper-parameters and specific
epochs of gradient descent, we can well optimize the pa-
rameters of GAE to implement link prediction.
Gradient extraction. Gradient information is crucial in
almost all machine learning tasks, along which we can well
optimize the parameters in the model. In our IGA, the
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Fig. 1: The framework of IGA against link prediction methods. First, we choose one link as the target to make predictors
cannot precisely work. Then, we calculate gradient for this target to generate a corresponding adversarial network
iteratively. Finally, the adversarial network and the original clean network are adopted as the input for various predictors
including GAE, DeepWalk, node2vec, CN, RA, Katz and Local Random Walk. These predictors will wrongly predict the
target in adversarial network while correctly predict it in the original clean network to implement the adversarial attack
.
gradient is also the direction to add perturbations, but the
calculation of gradient here is quite different. According to
Eq. (3), Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), the adjacency matrix is a group
of variables in the loss function like the weight matrices
W(0) and W(1), which means we can extract the gradient
of adjacency matrix. What differs from the training process
is that the loss function in Eq. (5) takes all links in A into
consideration while for adversarial attack, we just need
to consider a single link. For the target link Et, we need
construct the target loss function
L˜ = −wYt ln(A˜t)− (1− Yt) ln(1− A˜t), (7)
where Yt ∈ {0, 1} is the ground truth label of target link Et
and A˜t is the probability of the existence of Et calculated by
GAE.
With the loss function specified, we can calculate the
partial derivative of L˜ with respect to the adjacency matrix,
so as to get the gradient matrix
gij =
∂L˜
∂Aij
. (8)
Although GAE is a link prediction model only for
undirected network, GAE itself actually cannot pick out
whether the network we input currently is undirected or
not. Therefore, the gradient matrix is usually not symmetry.
Because we focus on the undirected network, we should
always symmetrize the gradient matrix. Here, we only keep
the upper triangular matrix after symmetrizing
gˆij = gˆji =
{ gij+gji
2 i < j
0 otherwise.
(9)
Adversarial network generator. Now, let us consider the
detail about how to generate the adversarial network.
In the process of gradient descent, we take the loss L
to a tiny value to acquire good prediction ability. Here, on
the contrary, we need to maximize the target loss L˜ to let
the model wrongly predict the target link. However, due
to the discreteness of adjacency matrix, we cannot directly
apply gradient ascent on the adjacency matrix to get the
adversarial network. Our IGA considers this limitation and
extracts the adversarial network as follow.
The value in the gradient matrix could be positive or
negative, the positive/negative gradient means the direction
of maximizing the target loss is increasing/decreasing the
value in the corresponding position of adjacency matrix.
Since the network data is discrete, we are only allowed
to add or remove links, i.e. we can only add or subtract
one in the adjacency matrix. The selection of these links
depends on the magnitude of gradient which indicates how
significant the link affects the loss function. The larger the
5magnitude is, the more significantly the link affects the
target loss. One thing should be noticed is that due to the
discreteness of network data, no matter how large the mag-
nitude is, we are not able to modify a existing/nonexistent
link whose gradient is positive/negative. These links is
regarded as not attackable and we simply skip them for
next attackable link.
Like the process of gradient descent, the generation of
adversarial network is also iterative. In every single itera-
tion, we first extract the gradient matrix and symmetrize
it to guarantee the network undirected. Then, we choose
n links of the largest gradient and is attackable at the
same time. By repeat these step for K times, we will get
the ultimate adversarial network which can fool the link
prediction methods.
The intact pseuda-code of our attack model is described
in Algorithms 1 and 2.
Algorithm 1: Adversarial network generator
Input: Original network G, number of iterations K ,
number of links modified in every iteration n.
Output: The adversarial network Gˆ.
1 Train the GAE model on original network G;
2 Initialize the adjacency matrix of the adversarial
network by Aˆ0 = A;
3 for h = 1 to K do
4 Calculate gradient matrix gh−1 based on the Aˆh−1;
5 Symmetrize gh−1 to get gˆh−1;
6 P = Construct perturbation(Aˆh−1, gˆh−1, n);
7 Aˆh+1 = Aˆh + P ;
8 end
9 return The adversarial network Gˆ, with the adjacency
matrix of adversarial network AˆK .
Algorithm 2: Construct perturbation
Input: Adjacency matrix A, symmetrized gradient
matrix gˆh−1, number of links modified n.
Output: The perturbation matrix P .
1 Initialize the perturbation matrix P as a zero matrix
with the same size as A;
2 for h = 1 to n do
3 Get the position (i, j) of largest magnitude in gˆh−1;
4 if gˆh−1ij > 0 and Aij = 0 then
5 Pij = 1;
6 else if gˆh−1ij < 0 and Aij = 1 then
7 Pij = −1;
8 else
9 Continue;
10 end
11 end
12 P = P + PT , where PT is the transpose of P;
13 return The perturbation matrix P .
2.4 Adversarial Attack Against GAE
Since the adversarial network is generated based on GAE,
the attack against the GAE model is a typical white-box
TABLE 2: The basic statistics of the three network data sets.
Data Set #Nodes #Links #Average Link Degree
NS 1461 2472 10.43
Yeast 2375 11693 59.23
Facebook 4039 88234 189.79
attack. Although along the direction of gradient, we can
generate tiny perturbations, based on which the adversarial
network are almost same as the original one. However,
under some special circumstances, such tiny perturbations
is also hard to implement due to some special limitations
and we need to know the performance of our attack model
in those cases.
Unlimited attack. Without any limitation on link modi-
fication, all the links decided by gradients are valid and the
only limitation is the total number of modified links. The
applicable scene of unlimited attack is when attacker owns
high authority. For instance, a data publisher wants to hide
some key links from being detected and there is no doubt
that the data publisher has the authority to alter their data
freely. Since the number of modified links is well controlled,
the data utilities usually will not be damaged.
Single node attack. A target link Et in the network is a
connection of two nodes (u, v), single node attack is defined
to modify and only modify links connect to either node
u or v. We assume in the real-world network, unlimited
attack may difficult to conduct since it requires high priority
of accessing all information in the network. And in most
successful unlimited attacks, the perturbations are usually
the modified links that directly connect to node u or v.
However, in single node attack, we can promise that at
least one of u and v can be well protected without any
link modification. For example, a fraud is the attacker who
wants himself to be recommended to an innocent user. In
other word, there is no link between the attacker and the
innocent user, we conduct attack to lead the recommender
predict the link exists. Instead of directly changing the
links of the innocent user node, changing the surroundings,
such as links connected to the attacker node, to fool the
recommender is more concealed.
2.5 Transferable Attack
GAE has overwhelming generalization ability, we assume
the adversarial attack can be still effective for other link
prediction methods, i.e., the perturbation generated by GAE
is universal and the attack thus has strong transferabil-
ity. We first test the transferability of adversarial network
on unsupervised embedding models including DeepWalk
and node2vec, to validate that such attack is quite uni-
versal. Then, we conduct the adversarial attack on classic
similarity-based indexes for link prediction, such as Com-
mon Neighbor, Resource Allocation, Katz index and Local
Random Walk, to see whether these traditional methods
have the ability to resist the adversarial networks.
The strong transferability of adversarial attacks via IGA
may bring the security concern for link prediction appli-
cations, since malicious examples may be easily crafted
even when the target link prediction method is unknown
in advance to conduct effective black-box attacks.
6TABLE 3: The link prediction performance comparison of
various predictors.
Predictors NS Yeast Facebook
Accuracy(%) AUC Accuracy(%) AUC Accuracy(%) AUC
GAE 100 0.9963 97.30 0.9692 99.86 0.9915
DeepWalk 94.16 0.9962 85.46 0.9220 92.70 0.9952
node2vec 92.34 0.9961 87.83 0.9224 93.06 0.9953
CN 48.18 0.9957 15.83 0.9212 31.37 0.9928
RA 77.74 0.9962 27.29 0.9222 44.77 0.9953
Katz(0.01) 48.18 0.9991 26.52 0.9711 10.01 0.6162
LRW(3) 38.32 0.9996 14.11 0.9732 18.60 0.9940
LRW(5) 43.43 0.9996 10.18 0.9771 17.16 0.9933
It should be noticed that the accuracies of similarity-based methods are
much lower than deep learning methods because they are evaluated on
Ω − Eo while deep learning methods only choose a small part from
Ω− Eo for test.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct adversarial attack on the GAE
compared with three baseline methods. Then we use the
adversarial network to test the robustness of a series of link
prediction methods. Further, we check the performance of
IGA under different limitations.
3.1 Experiments Setup
The data sets, baselines, parameter setting and link predic-
tion algorithms for transferability testing will be introduced
here. Our experimental environment consists of i7-7700K
3.5GHzx8 (CPU), TITAN Xp 12GiB (GPU), 16GBx4 memory
(DDR4) and Ubuntu 16.04 (OS).
Data sets. To test the performance of our IGA, We choose
three networks of different types for adversarial attack. The
data sets are all undirected and unweighted with different
scale.
• NS [49]: a network of co-authorships between scien-
tists who published papers in the field of network. It
contains 1589 scientists, 128 of which are isolated. We
simply remove those isolated nodes since prediction on
those nodes are meaningless.
• Yeast [50]: a protein-protein interaction network whose
giant component containing 2375 proteins and 11693 in-
teractions. Although the network is not well-connected,
the giant component contains the 90.75% of all nodes
and we choose it for our experiment.
• Facebook [51]: a social network where nodes represent
the users and links are their friendship relations. Face-
book is a large scale network containing 4039 nodes and
88234 links.
We summarize the topological feature of these data sets
shown in the TABLE 2.
Unlimited attack and single node attack are conducted
on these data sets.
Baseline. We compare IGA with three baseline methods.
Since this is the first time link prediction adversarial attack
is proposed, there’s no attack methods for adversarial attack
against link prediction methods. For comparison, we modi-
fied attack methods to implement link prediction attack.
• Random Attack (RAN): RAN randomly disconnects a
links in the original network, while randomly connects
b pairs of nodes that are originally not connected. This
is the simplest attack method.
• Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE) [39]:
DICE originally is a heuristic algorithm for disguising
communities. For the target community in the network,
DICE firstly delete a inner links and connected b links
from the community to nodes in a distance to make
the target invisible. In our experiment, we replace the
community by the target link, and the internal links are
those links directly connecting to the target link.
• Gradient Attack (GA): GA is a gradient based adver-
sarial attack method without iterations, i.e. GA gen-
erates perturbations by just calculating gradient once.
Therefore, the computational complexity of GA is much
lower than IGA while the accuracy is much lower
as a tradeoff. To realize GA, we just need to set the
parameter K=1 in IGA.
Parameter Setting. The first parameter in our exper-
iment is the number of modified link in the adversarial
network. Intuitively, if we set it very large, the goal of
fooling the predictor will easily achieve but the neighbors of
the target link will totally change. Because the perturbations
are too noticeable, the attack itself consequently is pointless.
How to set the number of modified link actually indicates
how to define the unnoticeable perturbations. Because mod-
ified links usually directly connect to the target link, in this
paper, we think the perturbation size should relate to the
degree of target link kt and should be different for different
target. The link degree, a.k.a. edge degree, is defined as
the number of links connected to this link. For nonexistent
link, the link degree is the summation of the degree of
two nodes that form this link. For existing link, we should
exclude the link itself when sum the degree. If the number of
modified links is much smaller than the target links degree,
we think the perturbations can be regarded as unnoticeable.
Therefore, in our experiments, the number of changed links
of three methods is set to the target link degree kt.
For IGA, we set n = 1 for highest accuracy and conse-
quently, set K = kt because n × K actually is the number
of modified link in total. In the baseline DICE and RAN, we
set a = kt/2 and b = kt/2.
Evaluation metric. To evaluate the performance of at-
tack, we use two metrics introduced as follow.
• Attack Success Rate (ASR): The attack success rate, i.e.,
the ratio of the target links which will be successfully
attack within kt modified links for each target versus all
target links. The larger ASR corresponds to the better
attack effect.
• Average Modified Link number (AML): It denotes the
average perturbation size leading to successful attack.
Although the total perturbation size for a target is set
to target link degree kt, we still focus on the minimal
perturbation size making attack successful. For those
failed attack, we regard it as the total perturbation
size kt. The smaller the AML is, the better the attack
performance is.
3.2 Results
Comprehensive experiments are carried out to testify the
attack performance and transfer attack. In this part, we will
show our experimental result in different aspects how IGA
is efficient compared with other baseline methods against
7TABLE 4: The attack results obtained by different attack methods against different link prediction methods on real-world
data sets.
Data Set Predictors
ASR(%) AML
IGA BASELINE IGA BASELINE
unlimited single RAN DICE GA unlimited single RAN DICE GA
NS
GAE 56.20 23.72 0.00 1.82 25.18 8.04 17.42 10.67 11.29 9.67
DeepWalk 76.83 100 6.67 49.81 28.52 5.74 2.71 11.70 9.63 9.15
node2vec 71.43 96.30 3.33 44.44 46.67 3.36 2.67 12.63 4.59 3.63
CN 100 100 2.33 83.33 100 4.19 4.18 15.02 8.17 5.16
RA 95.71 95.31 1.37 92.02 96.71 2.80 2.83 10.93 4.47 3.37
Katz(0.01) 100 100 2.27 83.33 100 4.18 4.18 14.82 8.16 5.12
LRW(3) 100 98.10 2.56 92.38 100 2.75 2.68 8.95 3.25 2.56
LRW(5) 100 99.16 4.17 94.96 100 2.14 2.01 6.10 2.73 2.00
Average 87.52 89.07 2.84 67.76 74.64 4.15 4.83 11.35 6.54 5.08
Yeast
GAE 69.52 32.19 0.00 2.03 36.99 46.78 62.65 70.87 67.27 61.21
DeepWalk 96.15 92.00 3.33 76.67 86.67 22.77 27.20 50.27 43.60 34.53
node2vec 96.15 96.00 3.33 76.67 92.31 22.46 26.40 50.80 45.20 36.46
CN 100 100 0.00 97.73 100 26.00 21.55 141.78 33.75 35.45
RA 98.63 100 0.00 97.73 100 22.75 19.23 70.09 42.01 32.30
Katz(0.01) 100 100 5.00 97.85 100 16.45 17.99 132.30 31.27 18.54
LRW(3) 100 100 0.00 96.67 100 4.10 4.53 26.00 6.57 4.40
LRW(5) 100 95.65 0.00 95.65 100 2.78 2.74 28.27 3.83 2.96
Average 95.06 89.48 1.46 80.13 89.50 20.51 22.79 71.30 34.19 28.23
Facebook
GAE 52.84 22.74 0.00 0.33 15.05 134.97 171 .77 198.57 189.94 161.51
DeepWalk 100 100 0.00 100 100 99.26 79.00 160.71 93.33 135.00
node2vec 100 100 0.00 100 100 80.10 83.67 176.00 94.33 132.00
CN 100 100 3.12 98.92 100 49.78 45.72 290.94 70.09 54.23
RA 100 100 0.00 90.77 94.57 40.50 35.38 264.56 81.43 72.85
Katz(0.01) 100 100 0.00 81.25 100 55.63 53.67 204.00 114.44 61.06
LRW(3) 100 100 11.11 93.22 91.38 15.98 22.31 232.11 61.12 25.50
LRW(5) 100 100 11.11 94.44 96.23 16.19 19.67 232.11 66.98 20.85
Average 94.11 90.34 3.17 82.37 87.15 61.55 63.90 219.87 96.46 82.87
For the Katz index, we set the damping factor to 0.01.
For two Local Random Walk predictors, we set the total walk steps to 3 and 5 respectively.
a bunch of link prediction methods on different real-world
data sets.
IGA has the best overall performance. We present the
overall attack success rate and perturbations of adversarial
network in TABLE 4. It is obvious that IGA has the best
overall performance. In most cases, compared with baseline
attack methods, IGA is the best attack method with highest
attack success rate and least average modified links in ad-
versarial networks. Surprisingly, even though the perturba-
tion size is not above the link degree, the ASR of IGA against
most predictors is exactly, or very close to 100%, except
the attack on GAE itself. The GA, whose computational
complexity is much less than IGA, still outperforms DICE
with the ASR being 100% against most similarity-based
predictors. As to the attack overhead, the AML of IGA is
significantly less than other attack baselines. Especially, for
the Facebook network, the average AML of IGA is 40% less
than DICE, which indicates that the adversarial network
generated by IGA is much more concealed and the gradient
is an accurate direction to generate perturbation.
Robustness analysis of networks. Impressively, for the
network Yeast and Facebook, although the average link
degree is quite large, we can still successfully conduct
adversarial attack with very few links changed, i.e. the ratio
of average AML to average link degree is smaller than
35%. Intuitively, for the network with dense structure, it
will be more robust against adversarial attack. However,
from our experimental results, we can see that the average
ASR on Yeast and Facebook is higher than NS. Since the
link in dense network has more complex environments,
the modified links could be more unnoticeable, which is
concerning.
GAE is the most robust predictor against adversarial
attack. Generally, white-box attack has better attack capac-
ity than black-box attack, since white-box has grasped the
internal information of the target methods, which is easier
to trigger effective attack. Interestingly, in our case, the
experiments show that black-box attack against traditional
link prediction methods has much higher success rate than
against GAE itself. Take NS and Facebook for examples,
the attack success rate against GAE is no higher than 60%,
while attack against similarity-based indexes is as high
as 100%. Especially for the Local Random Walk, IGA can
successfully fool it by only 3 or 4 links modified out of ten
thousand in Yeast, whose average link degree is about 60.
The poor resistance of those classic link prediction methods
to adversarial attack indicates that the robustness of them
should be highly concerned. Usually, the vulnerability of
deep model is concerned the most, but according to the
comprehensive experiments results, we find that GAE is the
most robust one. The DeepWalk and node2vec are also deep
models, and they can better resist the adversarial attack than
similarity-based methods.
Single node attack outperforms unlimited attack. We
compare the ASR of single node attack and unlimited attack
in TABLE 4. Another interesting note is that although single
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Fig. 2: Different attack methods against various of link prediction methods
node attack is a constrained conditional attack which limit
its modification target in network, however, it still outper-
forms unlimited attack. For example, in the NS data set, the
ASR of DeepWalk and node2vec under single node attack is
close to 100% while the ASR under unlimited attack is less
than 80%. We can explain the results. In single node attack,
9TABLE 5: ASR of links with different degree.
Networks Modified links Degree[2-3] [4-5] [6-7] [8-12] [13-20] [21-30] [31-]
NS
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 35.14 5.00 1.96 5.88 8.77 7.14 8.33
3 67.57 22.5 17.67 19.51 14.04 11.76 9.52
Yeast
1 12.5 4.26 1.43 2.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 23.21 10.64 7.14 2.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 33.93 19.15 10.00 2.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
the modified link is more focused on the one target node,
and the neighbors of the node may change more signifi-
cantly than unlimited attack. Therefore, although another
node is well protected, the goal of fooling predictors still
can easily achieve.
The visualization of four attack methods. In Fig. 2,
we visualize the four attack methods against eight link
prediction methods on three data sets. The attack against
GAE shows that IGA is much better than GA in white-
box attack because of the high accuracy of iteratively cal-
culating gradient. IGA also outperforms DICE especially
when against deep learning methods GAE, DeepWalk and
node2vec in NS and Yeast. But as to the Facebook data set,
DICE performs better than our IGA when against DeepWalk
and node2vec. When the perturbation size is above 50%,
DICE starts to add links which connect the target to nodes
in a distance. We think since the Facebook network is quite
large, the embedding generated by random walk could
change quite significantly if some nodes in a distance was
connected to the target. For the similarity-based methods,
the performance of all attack methods except RAND is
close because of the vulnerability of these link prediction
methods. In most cases, obviously, we still can find that
IGA and GA are better than DICE especially when the
perturbation is under 50%.
The attack on links of different degree. TABLE. 5 shows
the statistical result of ASR on links with different degree.
Since the Facebook network is much denser than NS and
Yeast, the ASR where only 3 links modified are all zero.
Therefore, we only post the experimental results of NS
and Yeast. Surprisingly, with less than 3 links modified, a
large number of targets will be successfully attack especially
for those with low degree. For example, with only 3 links
modified, the ASR are 33.93% and 19.15% for link in Yeast
whose degree are in range 3 to 20 and 21 to 30 respectively.
4 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a novel adversarial attack model
IGA against link prediction methods. Our IGA is based
on GAE link prediction methods, but experimental results
shows that IGA is quite effective to conduct adversarial on a
various of link prediction methods including deep learning
methods and classic similarity-based methods. IGA can be
utilized as the method for privacy protection or the metric
for robustness evaluation of link prediction methods. Since
we should take the whole adjacency matrix as the input for
gradient calculation, the adversarial attack on larger scale
network is quite difficult due to the memory limitation. Fur-
ther work should focus on solving this problem. The further
study of how to defend such link prediction adversarial
attack is also of great importance.
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